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ABSTRACT 
My aim here is to discuss first the fitness of a cognitive theory like RT when 
approaching the interpretive operations taking place in the translating activity. 
The basic notion of interpretive resemblance is put forward instead of the 
traditional one of equivalence. Secondly, the application of this cognitive 
framework is here discussed so as to tackle the case of intensifiers as a vague, 
"connotative" field of interpretation that puts to test the ínferential work of 
translators. I then focus on a few varied examples of actual translations which 
¡Ilústrate some of the contextual effects conveyed by intensifiers of various 
kinds. 
1. Introduction 
We will assume at the outset that translation is a human activity which involves a linguistic 
act, namely the rendition into a target language (TL) of a text (a collection of interrelated 
utterances) that had already been produced in a source language (SL). A fruitful, relevant 
way of approaching such rendition is by accounting for what goes on in that linguistic act 
in terms of communication process. This means that alongside the linguistic knowledge, a 
host of other neighbouring fields of knowledge are involved in it such as the complex 
phenomena traditionally described by theoretical humanistic sciences like sociology, 
psychology, ethnography, and the like. 
Most modern linguistic approaches make avail of a structural type of methodology 
which basically entails implementing some versión or other of a fixed-code semantic model 
that, as pointed out by Gutt (1991), has allegedly proved inadequate to describe what goes 
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on in linguistic communication and more specifically in that special human operatíon called 
íranslatíon. 
However, if we approach transiatíon as a cognitive actívity, there is little need for 
describing in much detail the manifold connections transiatíon has with other possible 
related fields of study. The emphasis should instead be laid on a double aspect of the 
phenomenon of translation. Firstly, on the translator's ability to process all the information 
stemming not only from the meanings conveyed by the linguistic code of the source text 
(ST), but also and crucially, from the relevant contextual effects produced by her active 
inferential work during her actual reading of the literary text involved (Pilkington, 1991). 
Secondly, on the reader's ability to get access both to the information provided by Üie 
linguistic code of the text concerned and to further relevant information derived from the 
translator's interpretation of it. This last operation is done through inferential work aimed 
at yielding enough contextual effects the reader deems worth while pursuing, as often 
claimed by Sperber and Wilson's (1986) seminal work. 
This last aspect of additional contextual effects should be considered of the utmost 
importance when translating aspects of texts whereupon we attempt to focus in the present 
paper. 
Suppose a translator comes across this sentence: 
(1) a. Jillis/?re«y wrong there. 
b. Jül esta en eso pero que muy equivocada. 
Some would suggest that there is an obvious lack of literal equivalence relation between the 
two utterances. It seems to me though that the Spanish expression marks a higher degree of 
intensification than the English. The expression "pero que muy" seems to me that it suggests 
a degree of intensification and emphasis that "pretty" lacks (a good rendering of it in 
English would be "very, very" or "most" i.e. the highest degree of intensification). The 
translation is then a bad one, no matter the intonational emphasis (focus stress) the English 
sentence may have been uttered with. 
On the other hand, there would be no way of knowing if the utterance (Ib) translates 
(la) appropriately, if the translation had been a more ambiguous expression like "un tanto" 
or simply "bastante", unless we look into the contextual effects produced by the use of the 
intensifiers in the reader's representation of both utterances: in the last case the truth 
conditions of the proposition need an enrichment so as to disambiguate the vague meaning 
coded by the intensifier. In sum, it is a major translator's job to account for all the 
information accessed in the act of reading the SL utterance and then do the same in the act 
of rendering that sentence into the TL. Now the thorny problem the reader-cum-translator 
has to iace is, how will she assess all those nuances of meaning, the so called 'connotative 
meaning', that are supposed to be reached through implicative mental operations? We 
assume that a case in point is provided by intensifiers as they are translated from one 
language into any other. 
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AU we know is that this last cognitíve operation is reached through inferential work 
which is the way our whole mental activity works. As argued by Sperber and Wilson: 
Propositional contents and attitudes thus seem to provide the only relatively solid ground on 
which to base a partly or wholly inferential approach to communication. Too bad if much of 
what is communicated does not fit the propositional mould (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 57). 
In fact we may perhaps put forward the hypothesis that (la) seems to bear a certain tone of 
modal mitigatíon here. There seem to be a hedging phenomenon which suggests a polite 
form that disguises a total disagreernent, thus bearing at least some resemblance to the less 
polite unmitigated Spanish utterance. Now the question which immediately arises is, on 
what grounds can we safely entertain that hypothesis? Could it not be a far-fetched 
assumption? The answer to this crucial question lies, to a great extent, in our belief in our 
own representations which are crucially based on our own knowledge of the two languages 
at issue. Representations (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) are hypotheses (strong or weak 
assumptions such as beliefs, intuitions and desires) about the world we entertain in our 
minds. A grammatical fünctional model of communication would insist on the scalar degree 
of modality in the English code: from epistemic and deontic modality to attitudinal 
adjectives and intensifying adverbs. By contrast, a cognitive model of communication 
should actually íay the emphasis not so much on the semantic content, which is 
automatically recovered by our language module but on the hearer's recovery of the final 
interpretation that the utterance has.. 
As able speakers then of at least two languages, translators should then be competent 
interpreters in both languages and for the same token they should be able in principie to be 
aware of the frequently subtle differences betweenthe two linguistic codes. 
2. Interpretive use 
The case of translation is that of an interpretive use of language (Gutt, 1991). It is the 
reader-cum-translator's competence what is at stake here since she's the solé referee. In 
effect, it is in her mind in the first instance where the whole double process of interpretation 
and production takes place. She therefore must be the most relevant judge when it comes 
to deciding what subtle or big differences there are between two sentences in two languages, 
ifthereisany. 
If a sound linguistic knowledge of the two languages involved seems fundamental for 
the interpretation of utterances, so does the knowledge (various representations like beliefs 
and assumptions) of the world. But then, one is tempted to ask, what role does the so often 
invoked semantics of a language play in the whole affeir of communication? (Coseriu, 
1977). As a conventional, objective description of the meanings of linguistic expressions 
(mostly single words), its job seems to be that of providing an undetermined blueprint for 
propositions. Then it is the task of pragmatics to show how the hearer/reader is able to 
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develop such blueprint into a complete proposition with the crucial help of her computing 
of contextual knowledge. (Blakemore, 1992: 43). 
It is my purpose in this paper to examine some of the effects produced by certain words 
andexpressionsthatareconvenüonally, ifsomewhatmisleadingly, called "intensifiers" (for 
lack of a better word). A further apparently synonymous term, "degree adverbs", are types 
of words which, closely examined, are not so easy to pin down as semantic bearers of some 
fixed, accurate meaning. Tbey therefore pose many problems for the translator who has 
often been misled by traditional semantic theories which attempt to approach the whole 
process of translation in terms of "equivalence" in the target language. The translator 
guided by such principie would be so concerned with context independent words that she 
will surely be bound to do mistaken operations such as the following: a) leave out her own 
response to the information provided by the work concerned; b) turn a blind eye to her faith 
in her own abilities as language speaker; and c) pay litüe attention to tbe modification of her 
own cognitive environment. 
Furthermore, the effects of the translator's reading could and should be compared to the 
one produced in a reader of the translation of that text (Dahlgren, 1998). Since the typically 
descriptive concept of linguistic equivalence seems to fail to be an adequate notion when one 
cares to report about the mental operations carried out in translation, we simply will do 
without such a misleading concept. bastead we will be concerned with resemblance as the 
dynamic notion that would best account for the possible contextual effects produced by such 
linguistic units in the actual utterances of texts. 
Gutt (1991: 33) provides a good example of an intensifier in relation to non literal 
language promoting economical communication: 
(2) a. Bill is a real ganster. 
b. Bill es un auténtico ganster. 
Here both the English and the Spanish proposition are likely to be read metaphorically as 
dealing with someone ruthless in his practices or someone whose behaviour is threatening. 
Let me add that some of the effects of that implicature are caused no doubt by the effect 
produced in our minds of the English intensifier "real", which has been rendered in Spanish 
by means of "auténtico". They seem to cause resembling effects in the reader. 
So the intended interpretation shares with the utterance a number of assumptions which 
are implicated precisely in this particular context. The first propositions (2a) then is said to 
bear some implications which account for the resemblance of the representations of the 
second proposition (2b) in the utterances of the two languages. The Spanish and the English 
versión of the proposition should then trigger "similar" representations. It is on these 
grounds in fact that we are allowed to conventionally state that the utterance in language B 
(the so called Target Language) can be more or less faithful to the utterance in Language A 
(the so called Source language). If English "real" would nave been translated in that 
utterance by Spanish "real" (as it is possible in other cases) then presumably the set of 
assumptions raised in the reader would have differed considerably. 
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According to Blakemore (1987) resemblance in content of two givenutterances can be 
cióse or distant depending on the variable shared contextual implications they give rise to. 
We may then say that representation by "resemblance" with respect to degree words 
crucially involves some implicatures that promote the speaker's attitude denoting quantity 
uncertainty and doubt concerning the degree of commitment to the trath of the proposition. 
3. Description vs interpretation 
Does a stractural (functional or not) theory íare well when they come to grips with the 
transcodification problem? Let me remind the reader that a structural (functional) theory is 
based on a paradigmatic view that attempts to predict a network of meaning relations as 
resourceful linguistic choices whereby a speaker can pick a linguistic form or feature out 
of a large number of available choices in a given system. Thus as speakers of English we 
have a grammar as a code readily available, even if most variable according to general 
social factors. Such grammar is made up of inter-related systems which are to be chosen at 
any point in the discourse process. It is therefore on the speaker's onus to use one or another 
meaning as a manifestation of her linguistic behaviour in accordance with the social context 
(Halliday, 1985). 
But is this a convincing way of explaining what goes on in actual communication? Let's 
say that only to some extent, since a taxonomical (albeit functional) approach would 
typically focus on linguistic entities, that is, the meanings of words or expressions codified 
as objective resources described apriori which are at the speaker's disposal in a network 
of choices in some (social, therefore externa!) context. Moreover, such descriptive network 
of features of contextual factors must be in a constant process of expansión since they are 
either too vague or too inappropriate, which means that there's plenty of guesswork ahead 
for the reader and translator if she wishes to get an accurate equivalent expression. 
Now, seen from a cognitive perspective, Blakemore (1987) argües that some 
expressions (such as so and after all) do not contribute to the truth conditional meaning of 
the utterance, since they do not represent concepts. Degree adverbs, however, represent 
some concepts (minimizing, downgrading, etc), and therefore they have a clearer semantic 
referent. It is trae, on the other hand, that they sometimes show a fuzzy, underdetermined 
nature, typical of many expressions in the linguistic code (Carston, 1991a;, 1991b). They 
need then to be accounted for in terms of the. semantic information they provide, bearing 
also in mind the surplus information providing some contextual effects. The latter would 
typically give rise to slight modifications of one's cognitive environment. In sum, 
translation should never be approached as a case of equivalence, a hypothetical concept hard 
to test and falsify, but as a case of resemblance. Similarity of effects produced by two 
resembling utterances in the reader's representations would be a much more appropriate 
notion faithfully accounting for what actually goes on in bilingual communication (Gutt, 
1991). 
Consider these examples: 
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(3) a. I can't hardly say that I know him. 
b. Yo no diría que le conozco bien. 
Linguistic structures can differ as means of expressions and as blueprints for inferencial 
interpretatíon. That both utterances resemble each other is a matter that goes beyond 
comparison of formal stractures. The use of the minimiser hardly is rendered in Spanish by 
a negative affecting the verb and a positive adjective bien here. It seems quite evident that 
both utterances have similar implications. 
Translating from one language into another then is a matter of interpretive resemblance 
in the listener/reader's representations of propositions expressed in both the utterance of 
language A and the utterance of language B, no matter how far away or how cióse the 
languages are formally and/or typologically. For most theories of translation it seems 
reasonable to claim that familiar languages should be able to share formal features of the 
linguistic code that to some extent favour the resemblance of the propositions formally 
expressed in such languages. But this is hardly the point we should make in the present 
approach. Rather, the interesting point that should be raised in translation theory is that we 
should be able to explain why apparently dissimilar sentences can resemble each other in 
inferential terms even if their coding forms differ. 
In the example (1) above the use of the intensifier "pretty" before the adjective "wrong" 
would have the implicature that Jill was totally wrong, but for polite reasons (a negative face 
issue, according to Brown and Levinson, 1987) one tends to mitígate the harsh effects of a 
complete negative utterance. Sothedowntoner "pretty" resemblesthe "totally" butwiththe 
implicated effect of poüte mitigation. In Spanish, however, the speaker chose to say 
squarely that Jill is wrong. 
Consequently, one is tempted to think that the form of a language is a kind of centuries 
oíd resourceful deposit where much knowledge of the speakers is somehow stored. 
However this last statement does not justify a mere formal comparison of two structures (as 
many translation theorists have done and still do today) with the purpose of indicating 
equivalence of meaning of sentence A and sentence B. 
4. The case of Intensifiers 
Halliday (1985: 171) formally describes intensifiers under the heading of functional sub-
modification, even if sometimes such class of word can disturb the natural ordering of 
elements in the (nominal)group. 
(4) a. a quite easy problem. 
b. quite an easy problem. 
The term intensifier suggests a particular semantic type of adjective modifier, one which 
very often corresponds to adverbs of degree. Verbal degree modifiers are not rare eitíier. 
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However, most of them show a double function, since they can be used both as adjective 
and as verbal modifiers. The class based on syntactic grounds is too varíed to have a 
homogeneous classificatíon. Semantic división too shows that they are not totally similar 
and have an uncertain área at the border (Allerton, 1987). This author, in fact, goes on to 
classify intensifiers into four major semantic categories: degree, aspect, manner, and 
method, which in turn modify both adjectives and lexical verbs. This is an overall 
classificatíon which is in fact grounded on a mixture of formal and semantic criteria. 
Quirk et al. (1985: 445-446, 589f.) however had typically splitup adjective and verb 
modifiers of degree into a more detailed content categories: 
"amplifiers" which scale upwards. 
"downtoners" which have a lowering effect. 
"emphasizers" though they bear resemblance to 'focusing disjuncts'. 
Then they subdivide the first two groups into the sub-headings: 
amplifiers: "maximizers" (completely) and "boosters" (very). 
downtoners: "approximators" (almost), "compromisers" (moreorless), "diminishers" 
(partly) and minimizers (hardly). 
This very detailed taxonomic classificatíon can be criticized on various counts, the most 
important being that like most semantic taxonomies this is as arbitrary as any alternative 
proposed ad hoc. In fact the meaning of quite a few of the words under those sub-headings 
become more concrete and determined when they appear in context. Therefore the above 
categories are bound to belong to one or several of the semantic groups proposed. 
If the meaning of most words were settled before any receiver of the utterance added a 
cognitive context to it, then the code would be an invariable not actually worth interpreting, 
but a given which would only be decodified. Then the whole process of translation would 
be viewed as a descriptive operation of comparable linguistic structures (Catford, 1965), 
where the unchanging static valué of "equivalence" would reign supreme. Furthermore, the 
often quoted "faithfulness" would be a quality to be displayed by objective structures of the 
languages involved. By contrast, communication is primarily and above all inferential, as 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) rightly claim. 
Once a text (collection of relevantly interrelated utterances) is translated the 
resemblance is all the more notíceable because it shows inevitable variations owed to 
modifications not only of language but also of specific cultural features. As Gutt (1991:59) 
suggests when discussing this point: 
The writer of the Germán text (his example) may have found the Finnish original helpful in his 
task, but the text he created was intended to communicate in its own right, and to be read and 
understood as such. It may be worth pointing out that this distinction between descriptive and 
interpretive use applies not only to interiingual communication — parallel cases occur 
intralingually as well. 
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5. Degrees of intensity 
It would be perhaps just to say that the issue of intensifiers is a somewhat difficult and 
slippery matter for the translator since what is often at stake is in foct a question of "more 
or less" depending on contextual assumptions. But that is hardly an excuse for failing to 
attempt to reproduce some similar effect in the TL reader. In a trilingual versión we read: 
(5) a. The finish would be a sight to see 
b. Das Ende wurde ein sehenswertes Schauspiel sein! 
c. El final debía ser todo un espectáculo 
A Gricean (1975) approach would involve an implicature that accounts for the clash 
between the first maxim of quantity and the second maxim of truthfulness. The speaker 
would have followed the latter and then flout the former. Understatement and overstatement 
are to some extent noticeable changes which aftect quantity. The Spanish translator seems 
to have decided to use the maxirnizer todo which is absent in the English original. This use 
of the intensifier actually resembles the English use oí quite absent in the original in this 
particular case. By and large the translators have found easier to alter the degree of the 
information required than to alter the truthfulness of the statement. 
Thus in the next examples the relative scalar criteria imposes itself when translating the 
words of the type quite and such. The following translation can be critizised, as demasiado 
is situated to one end of the quantitative semantic scale which such would hardly occupy. 
So perhaps tan would do the quantitative job. 
(6) a. It's been such a silly game to play. 
b. Era un juego demasiado estúpido. 
Now there are various other expressions in the languages which are colloquially used to 
mean intensification. Not only are they used in adjective pre-modification with an 
undeniable exclamatory valué, but also with some value-laden words: 
(7) a. The mayor of Madrid is such a fool. 
b. Anda que no es tonto el alcalde de Madrid. 
Quite interestingly, Bolinger (1972) suggests that nouns Vkefool can also be gradable, in 
the sense of a scale of assessment, and of degree. Those nouns derive from gradable 
adjectives, as we can also see in the colloquial expressive formula used by the Spanish 
translator. The degree word here seems to convey the additional connotation of criticism 
expressed in colloquial terms. 
In fact the use of such is grammatically restricted to the indefinite determiner sucha and 
can be interpreted as an exclamation, like in the present case, and not as a definite 
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determiner *such the/my etc. Furthermore, there are nouns like doctor, bachelor, etc which 
are not to be used in that way. 
The lexical meaning of the adjective is determinant in the interpretation of the degree 
modifiers such as absolutely, extremely, very, pretty, rather, fairly, slightly, not quite, not 
very. The context then varíes with the words collocated with them: 
(8) a. This case is slightly different from last month's. 
b. Este caso es un tanto diferente al del mes pasado. 
Now slightly collocates (tends to appear cióse to) restrictively either with comparative 
adjective as is the case of (8a) or with adjectives which have a negative shade of meaning. 
Thus, slightly unpleasant, boring, tiresome, disagreeable (but slightly pleasant?, 
interesting?, stimulant ?, kind?). 
In a Spanish versión of the short story by Saki "The Open Window", we note the 
relative Mure to appreciate the degree in the interpretation of this type of intensifiers: 
(9) a. Thenyouknow/?racrfcaZ/;y «oíWngaboutmyaunt? 
b. ¿Entonces, apenas sabe algo de mi tía? 
c. ¿No sabe, entonces, nada en absoluto de mi tía? 
The intensifier practically can be taken as synonymous to absolutely, totally, but here the 
translator in (9b) clearly has mitigated the effects of the negative, thus leading the reader to 
infer the implicature that the character concerned knows at least something that is worth 
knowing about bis aunt. The understatement, if we accept (9b) at all as a resembling 
translation, is on the Spanish side this time. We should surely derive further implicatures 
if we widen slightly the context of the utterance to allow in room for our knowledge of the 
characters involved in the dialogue. We then propose (9c) as a closer translation, where the 
common expression en absoluto renders the extreme intensifier practically. 
In the same translation of Saki's story we find a further variation in the degree of this 
type of intensifier. The overall effect again is a not very common use of understatement in 
Spanish (may be the contrary is closer to the truth): 
(10) a. Pity you weren't out; we had quite a good day. 
b. Es una pena que no salieras; hemos tenido un buen día. 
The relative scalar valué of intensifiers makes them difficult to be rendered in a similar 
resembling manner. Quite often we see departures from actual resemblance in the reception 
of the two languages, which easily go unnoticed by the readers, as they represent but small 
subtle changes. 
Look at this trilingual translation of Mark Twain's A Table-Talk: 
(11) a. It was g&X&a.g pretty sultry for me. 
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(11) b. Mir wurde schwül und schwüler. 
(11) c. Empezábala a sentir bochorno 
Neither the Germán ñor the Spanish versión are formally equivalent. And they need not to 
be. The interpretation of the Germán versión focases on the increasing graduality of the 
mental state (schwül and schwüler), while the Spanish versión stresses the time adverb ya 
so as to reinforce the inchoative process used. The intensifying, assessing meaning of pretty 
seems to be absent in either case. 
The fact that the grammatical resources to implicate assessment of degree shows much 
linguistic variation speaks loudly in favour of the interpretive character of all translations. 
It would be aknost impossible to describe accurately all the possibilities a producer or a 
translator has at her disposal to access to certain effects. But in the event that this could be 
achieved, there would still be the problem of attaching a meaning to a form in an accurate 
way. 
Notice, for instance, how the translator of a story has reached some similarity of effect 
(or not quite) by means of a formally different expression: 
(12) a. Ymjust simply crazy about that man. 
b. La verdad, ese hombre me vuelve loca. 
Here the evaluative intensifiersy'iííí plus the understating degree adverb simply before the 
noun crazy, is rendered by a disjunct phrase (Quirk, 1985) which is also evaluative and have 
some implicatures of the type / must admit, there 's nothing I can do about it. All we can say 
here is that the translator somehow managed to put across similar relevant information in 
this case. And this has been done only by linguistic means. In fact the basic claim of 
relevance theory is that in processing information the hearer focuses her attention on the 
achieving the greatest possible cognitive effects while doing the smallest possible amount 
of processing effort. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) postúlate that human communication is driven by relevance 
and the maximization of relevance. By this notion they mean that information is relevant to 
somebody if it yields enough contextual effects worth paying attention to. They are of three 
types: strengthening previous assumptions, contradicting them, and generating new 
assumptions or implicatures. 
Look at the following example from an early Spanish translaíion of Stephen Crane's 
famous work The Red Badge of Courage: 
(13) a. 'Yank', the other hadinformedhtm 'yer arightdum good feller'. 
b. Manqui —le había dicho el otro— eres un muchacho requetebueno. 
The speliing here reflects the native dialect where the intensifying cues are not just the 
common modifier right but also the modifying noun dum (damn) with respect to the 
adjective good. Now the Spanish versión yields sufficient contextual effects through that 
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colloquially expressed amplifier (a real booster) with some affective, positíve overtones. 
What seems important then is the similarity of the effects yielded by linguistic means, which 
actually change our cognitive environment and can be variously achieved. 
By contrast, we can come across the extreme case where no intensifier is translated and 
still achieve the intensity through lexical means. In a good recent Spanish translation of 
Gulliver's Travels we read this line: 
(14) a. I was extremely tired. 
b. Estaba exhausto. 
This suggests that we need not follow too closely a formal or functional grammar which 
describes classes of words neatly set in contrast with the correspondent same type of words 
in other languages. We often find a zero realization of a specific class of words. 
Now we will never harp too much on the idea that utterances are far richer in effects 
than a mere formal description of sentence meaning would allow us to entertain. To 
illustrate this further I would like to draw the reader's attention to three different instances. 
First note the intensiflcation effect that a certain type of adjectives can cause in the 
reader of English and their actual renditions into other languages: 
(15) a. It was open — wide, wide open— and 1 grew furious as I gazed upon it. 
b. Es war offen — weit, weit offen— and ich wurde rasend, ais ich darauf starrte. 
c. Lo tenia abierto — muy, muy abierto— y me enfurecí más al contemplarlo. 
While the Germán versión of The Tell-Tale Heart by E.A. Poe makes a servile use of the 
same grammatical structure, where the effect of the repetitive descriptive adjective is that 
of iconic intensiflcation, the Spanish translator fully reflecte this same effect by using a 
native language structure in his versión. He is to search, however, for alternative 
translations that sound more iamiliar to Spanish readers. There are often expressions where 
to choose from that sound like more typical Spanish intensifiers: 
(15) d. Lo tenía abierto de par en par y me enfurecí más al contemplarlo. 
Secondly, a further example of lexicalization of the degree of intensity is the formulaic 
comparisons. This is a very rich and productive field of study in some languages, like 
Spanish. One example of this type of amplifying effect can be the one we find in the well 
known American novel The Catcher in the Eye: 
(16) a. They are nice and all — I am not saying that— but they are touchy as hell. 
b. Son buena gente, no digo que no, pero a quisquillosos no hay quien les gane. 
Thirdly and lastly, there is a further related phenomenon, called hedging which I will briefly 
comment upon. By using "hedges" the writer makes manifest her intention of being not too 
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assertive and of sounding tentative. Linguistic hedges are, according to Lakoff (1987:462), 
"words orphrases whosejob is to make things more or lessfuzzy". I assume that there is 
implicit a sort of strategy in the use of these expressions aimed at avoiding facing 
communicaíion directly. There is little doubt that degree words of the downtoning type 
(compromisers, dirniíüshers and rninimizers) are also involved here. They should therefore 
contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition, in spite of the inherent tentative 
semantic meaning they nave. 
To offer just one last conspicuous example of this type of reverse intensification from 
I will quote again the same American novel, which is characteristically plagued with 
expressions of fhatkind: 
(17) a. But she wasn 't exactly the type that drove you mad with desire. 
b. Vamos, no era precisamente el tipo de chica como para volverle a uno loco. 
The negative predication with the adverb exactly is an ironical understatement which yields 
the implicature of avoiding the Gricean maxim oftruthfulness for being ironical and perhaps 
the maxim of manner for being slightly ambiguous. However, we may argüe that this 
expressive circumlocution and the implicative constraint of the negative provides an 
enriching contextúa! effect to the information supphed by the coded proposition. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
One major point made by relevance theory is that the grammatical and lexical codes of a 
language are not enough to explain communication. The traditional approaches to 
translation have invariably focused on the more or less detailed description of that code — 
syntax plus lexical semantics mainly. However, as I have stated above, translation is a case 
of practical language activity that involves both interpreting utterances information and re-
producing them again. Now in order to do that, inferential work is essential in order to 
compute all the information intended by the writer, no matter how vague, how tentative or 
how "connotative" it is. Thus the overall principie of relevance cognitively guides the 
translator so that she may derive all the possible enriching effects the text displays. 
The rendition then of the text into another language (TL) should be guided by such 
universal cognitive principie and thus allow the translator to give the closest resembling 
utterances to the source text as possible. The search for the alleged ideal equivalence 
between the two texts is ruled out from this perspective. 
Being then led by the overriding/>rí«cipZe of relevance means that the translator cannot 
rely solely on her supposedly competence of the grammars of two languages. I think that 
I have shown in this paper that there is in fact scarce prediction and little coincidence in the 
rendering of intensification. This in tum reflects the varied semantic resources in tlie 
grammatical and lexical expressions in many languages, no matter how typologically or 
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historically cióse they are. The enrichment of assumptions in the reader can actually be 
reached through various other expressions than the commonly known. 
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